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OLIGOPOLY UNDER ATTACK:
NEW APPROACHES TO AN
OLD PROBLEM
DON T. HIBNER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Antitrust Act' has served as the cornerstone of anti-
trust policy for nearly 80 years. As a result of its constitutional broadness and
the judiciary's willingness to give its provisions continually widened inter-
pretations, it has been an apt vehicle for adapting to the tempers of the
time. In the 1890's the Act was successfully utilized to denounce the most
flagrant types of abuse by monopolies and dominant combinations in key
industries.2 And again, in the 1920's and 1930's, it was useful in restricting
a variety of specific trade practices, such as tie-in sales, exclusive dealings,
group boycotts, and territorial division of markets. However, while the
Sherman Act was able to cope with a variety of trade abuses arising from
concerted action, it was not until the 1940's that attention was focused on
different forms of economic behavior. Monopoly power, while a target
under the earliest of Sherman Act cases, was attacked primarily on the
grounds of combinations and conspiracy. 3 With United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America4 (Alcoa) and American Tobacco Co. v. United States,5 the
mere possession of monopoly power was put in issue- where it had been
deliberately acquired or purposely maintained. 6 It was suggested that
various types of trade practices might be illegal in the context of monopoly
power even where the same practices would otherwise have been perfectly
permissible. 7
During this same period a group of renowned economists,8 and at
least one law professor,9 popularized the view that oligopoly power
*Member of the California Bar. A.B., Stanford University, 1955; LL.B., Stanford
University, 1962.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
3See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
4 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
Old.; 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7 See, eg., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
8J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 530-31 (1959); E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ch. 3 (8th ed. 1962); W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE
FEW-OLIGOPOLY AND SIMILAR MARKET STRucTuREs ch. 1 (1949); G. STIGLER, MONOPOLY
AND OLIGOPOLY BY MERGER 40 (1950); Kaysen, Collusion Under the Sherman Act, 65 Q.J.
ECON. 263 (1951).
9 See Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, .14 U. Chi.
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was almost as objectionable as monopoly power, and should not be con-
doned.10 Oligopoly refers to a form of imperfect competition where there
are but few sellers in the market. According to theory, there is an "inter-
dependence" among these few sellers, and each seller is aware that any
action he takes may induce a predictable reaction upon the part of his few
competitors. As a result a static market that has many of the earmarks of
a monopoly may exist- even in the absence of any overt collusion.11 Be-
cause "oligopoly" is by definition a condition falling short of monopoly,
in which a single company has the power to control the whole market, it
has not been subject to traditional Sherman Act regulation.
While the Sherman Act has not yet been successfully used to attack
vested oligopoly,12 the Justice Department and the courts are now keenly
aware not only of the problem of oligopoly, but also of the economic lore
of oligopoly theory. In nine key decisions since 1962, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly struck down mergers which would have further entrenched
oligopolistic market power1 3 Not only has the Supreme Court recognized
the views of the economists, but it has granted to their writings a virtual
imprimatur. For example, Stigler, Bain, Machlup, Markham and Mason
are now cited with approval along with judicial precedent in United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank,14 and contrary economic evidence offered
by a defendant may even be dismissed as too time consuming. 15 Indeed, the
approved writings of these economists have given rise to rules of presumptive
illegality. In Philadelphia Bank, the Supreme Court, citing Stigler, Bain,
Mason, Markham, and Machlup, ruled that any horizontal merger would
be presumed illegal if it "produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market ....,16 In the particular case before
the Court in Philadelphia Bank, the test was met since the merger would
have produced a surviving firm with a market share of 30 percent, while
increasing the share held by about one-third. One reason for the presump-
L. REv. 567 (1947). See also Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Pur-
pose?, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 745 (1949).
10 See, e.g., J. BAIN, supra note 8, at 530-31.
11 See generally E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 8, at 12-25, 30-55; G. HALE & R. HALE,
MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 131-37 (1958); G. STOCKING &
M. WATKrNS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 85-95 (1951).
12 Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts -From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 295 (1967).
13 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 US. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 US. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962). Cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture).
14 374 U.S. 321, 363 nn.38-39.
151d. at 362-63.
26 Id. at 363.
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tive rule was to enable lower courts to dispense with having to assess all of
the relevant economic data in determining the probable future effects of
a merger. The burden is now shifted to the defendant to present evidence
"clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have . . . anticompetitive
effects." Thus, it is evident that the main emphasis in merger law at least
since Brown Shoe Co. v. United States'7 and Philadelphia Bank has been
to prevent the further "tightening" of oligopolistic markets through acqui-
sition of existing or potential competitors.
A problem that is a corollary to preventing further concentration in
oligopolistic markets is how to cope with problems presently existing in
such markets. If it is sound policy to prevent mergers that would further
concentration, it is at least a valid hypothesis that it is sound policy to
deconcentrate markets where such concentration already exists. Proposals
for attacking existing oligopolistic markets are not new. Professor Eugene
Rostow made such proposals as early as 1947,18 when he urged utilization
of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, in the
well known work Antitrust Policy, suggested a statute condemning "un-
reasonable market power" and proposed that firms possessing such power
should be dissolved. 19 However, nothing was done, either judicially or legis-
latively to implement either proposal, and the merger field remained the
arena for the formulation of oligopoly policy.
Since the adoption of oligopoly theory by the Supreme Court, more
proposals have been advanced. One is the Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines.20 While the Guidelines do not address themselves specifically to
the deconcentration of existing oligopolies, they certainly evidence the
concern of the Justice Department in this area. Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that the stringency of the Guidelines may reflect in part the earlier
view of the Chief of the Antitrust Division, Donald Turner, that once a
market has become highly concentrated, there is little that can be done
under existing law to prevent noncompetitive pricing.21 The first exhaustive
article on oligopoly power in a legal context was written by Joseph F.
Brodley, and was entitled Oligopoly Power Under The Sherman and Clayton
Acts- From Economic Theory to Legal Policy. 22 After carefully chronicling
the marriage between oligopoly theory and merger policy, Mr. Brodley con-
'7 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
18 Rostow, supra note 9.
19 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 110 et seq. (1959).
20 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, in 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4430,
at 6683-85 (1968).
21 Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN L. Rkv.
1562, 1566 (1969). That little could be done via section 1 of the Sherman Act has been
Professor Turner's thesis for some time. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
The Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655,
660-66 (1962).
22 Brodley, supra note 12.
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cluded that he would utilize additional rules of presumptive illegality in
merger cases, but would not grapple with the concept of dissolution of an
existing oligopoly.H Others, however, would go farther. Richard A. Posner
recently authored an article entitled Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach.24 Professor Posner's thesis is that section 1 of the Sher-
man Act can be utilized to condemn the results of classic oligopoly pricing. In
his view, the "interdependence" of the oligopolists is tantamount to "tacit
collusion," and should be prosecuted as such.25 Although Professor Turner
took an opposite position in a recent article,26 he did express the view that
section 2 of the Sherman Act can and should be interpreted to authorize the
dissolution of leading firms in highly oligopolistic industries.27 In addition,
Professor Turner recommended legislation which would hopefully effect the
necessary relief but would exclude criminal sanctions and private rights of
action.28 Finally, the White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy29
has recommended specific legislation to deconcentrate highly concentrated
industries, and has drafted a "Concentrated Industries Act."
The purpose of this article will be to analyze the feasibility of these
various proposals in the light of (a) the present state of knowledge of the
behavior of oligopolistic markets and (b) the effects on antitrust policy, if
any, that would result should one or more of the suggestions be adopted. It
is the author's conclusion that in each case the medicine is worse than the
disease. What makes sound merger policy does not necessarily make good
sense when applied either to an extension of the Sherman Act or to new
legislation aimed at dissolution of highly concentrated oligopoly markets.
BASIC OLIGOPOLY THEORY- THE PROBLEM
The Classic Oligopoly - Its Behavior
The impetus to present day oligopoly theory probably had its genesis
in Theory of Monopolistic Competition, published by Professor Chamberlin
in 1933.30 Professor Chamberlin's thesis was that the structure of the
oligopoly market rendered it almost as objectionable as monopoly itself.8 '
Oligopoly means "few sellers." It has been defined as "the form of im-
perfect competition which obtains when sellers are few in number and any
one of them is of such size that an increase or decrease in his output will
231 d. at 342-45.
24 Posner, supra note 21.
25 Id. at 1605.
26 Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. R~v. 1207, 1225-31 (1969).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REC. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
30 E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
31 E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 8, at ch. 33. For a good analysis of oligopoly theory,
see G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 131-37.
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appreciably affect the market price."3 2 Because each of the sellers can affect
market price by unilateral action, such a structure is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the classical model of "perfect competition." There, a single
seller, through increase or decrease in output, cannot affect the shares of the
other sellers, and accordingly cannot affect price either. When sellers are few,
each is aware that any action he may take is likely to induce a reaction
upon the part of his competitors. If he cuts price, or increases output, the
other sellers may be expected to do likewise, and everyone is worse off. 3
Should one seller raise his price, he does not know whether his fellows will
follow suit. If they do, all may profit, unless increased prices encourage
entry by more participants. If they do not follow suit, however, our seller
may lose sales to his rivals and will have to lower prices once again. Because
of the small number of sellers, any change by any one of them will have a
profound effect on each of the others. Rational business behavior, without
any overt collusion, would dictate that changes in output, price, or both
will be fewer than in markets with many more sellers. Because a seller can
anticipate a prompt reaction that will nullify his gain, the oligopolist seller
and his competitors are said to be "interdependent" in their pricing be-
havior.3 4 That is, the decision of any one of them is interdependent with
the anticipated countermoves of the others. The natural result is a ten-
dency to avoid rigorous price competition. Thus, the rational self-interest
of the sellers will be to charge similar prices, and sooner or later, to charge
prices that will yield the largest return, depending on the degree of ease
of entry into the market, the level of technology in the industry, and
numerous other facts that necessarily differ from market to market. Where
potential competition is great and/or where entry requirements are low,
the price equilibrium may be no higher than in a market with many more
sellers. Where entry requirements are high, and where price competition is
minimal, the oligopoly market may exhibit other characteristics. Selling
expenses may increase, particularly in advertising. The product will be
"differentiated" by each seller. Each seller will induce customers to think
that his product is of higher quality than that of rival firms.35 The promo-
tion of brand names may be a phenomenon in aid of this principle. In
short, there will be increased competition as to claims of quality and ser-
vice, and less as to price.
Where one of the firms in the oligopoly is particularly larger or more
innovative than the others, "price leadership" may result. This firm, in
effect, will make all of the pricing decisions within the market, and the
other oligopolists will follow suit. In this situation, the traditional analysis
32 C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 21, 1940).
33 G. HALE e R. HALE, supra note 11, at 131-32.
34 Turner, supra note 21, at 660-66.
35G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 131-33.
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has been that the price leader will hold a price "umbrella" over the smaller
firms, enabling them to sell their output at higher prices. Professor Mark-
ham described it in the following manner:
The rationale behind the partial monopolist type of price leadership
is as follows: in an industry composed of one larger producer and a num-
ber of small ones, the large producer sets a price on the basis of the
visualized demand schedule for the commodity, after allowing for the
quantities that will be supplied at all possible prices by the small pro-
ducers. The required conditions are that the dominant firm sell a suffi-
ciently large proportion of the commodity, that the small firms individually
ignore any effect they may have on price, and that the dominant firm must
behave passively-it sets a price and sells the remainder after the small
producers have sold all they wish at the prevailing price.f
There are a number of studies that tend to confirm the above hypoth-
esis as to price behavior in oligopolistic markets. 3 7 A study by Professor Bain
has indicated that there is a positive correlation between concentrated
oligopoly markets and high profits. The study, covering 42 industries over a
five year period, showed that where eight firms in an industry accounted
for at least 70 percent of the sales, above average profits resulted.
Professor Bain also noted that the same pattern did not hold in cases
where more than eight sellers accounted for the same percentage. 38 It is
important to note that such oligopoly behavior will be expected even in the
absence of any formal or informal agreement whatsoever. The key difference
between an oligopolistic market and an unconcentrated market is that
oligopolists have more information upon which to base their decisions. 9
Indeed, it is rational behavior that causes the oligopoly problem.
While oligopolies are expected to behave "anticompetitively" without
the necessity of collusion, such markets are nevertheless prime candidates
for "hard core" Sherman Act violations. The very fact that one seller can
affect the fortunes of every other seller may be an impetus for a price-fixing
or market-sharing arrangement. The fact that the sellers are few makes it
easier to police such an agreement. 40 There are fewer forces to contend
with and "cheating" is more easily discovered and eliminated. Where the
size of the participants varies greatly, costs and pricing judgments may
vary considerably, and an administered arrangement may seem necessary
36J. MARKHAM, COMPETITION IN THE RAYON INDUSTRY 101 (1952). Cf. F. MACHLUP,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 476 (1952).
37J. BAIN, supra note 8, at 266-315; W. FELLNER, supra note 8, at 175-91. While these
studies generally yield positive relationships, the Stigler Committee has pointed out
that concentration is not a major determinant of differences in profitability among
industries. 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115 CONG.
REc. 6475 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafted cited as STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT].
38J. BAIN, supra note 8, at 411-16.
89 See Turner, supra note 21, at 665-66.
40 For a good example of the difficulties in administering a price-fixing agreement,
see Demaree, How Judgment Came For The Plumbing Conspirators, FORTUNE, Dec. 1969,
at 96.
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to avoid destructive price wars from breaking out periodically. Every highly
concentrated or "tight"41 oligopoly has the potential of lapsing into a
serious Sherman Act violation simply because of its structure. Where other
variables are eliminated, this potential may be even more dangerous. Where
a product is specified or standardized, the danger increases. Where the
purchasers are relatively few in number, and the size of individual sales
substantial, the danger is still greater. The potential of an oligopoly, how-
ever, is only an argument for vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act as
it now exists. No one can seriously doubt that the Sherman Act is an ef-
fective method for prosecuting the blatant hard core price-fixing con-
spiracy. The potential for collusion cannot be used as an argument for the
proposals that will be discussed in this article.
A Dissenting View
The question remains as to whether sufficient knowledge is currently
available to support the traditional thesis that oligopolies behave "anticom-
petitively." A further question persists - whether there are more than a few
oligopolies that meet the conditions of the classical model. Market defini-
tion, degree of technology, ease of entry, and trend of demand are all factors
that may alter the behavior of any particular market having few sellers.
George and Rosemary Hale have taken the position that the analysis offered
by Professor Chamberlain in 1933 is now viewed as incomplete and inconclu-
sive.42 The real world may simply be too imperfect for Professor Chamber-
lin's laboratory conditions to be met. Professor Galbraith has been one of
the severest critics. He stated as far back as 1949 that:
In dealing with small numbers or oligopoly, Professor Chamberlin,
who went farthest with the problem on a general theoretical level, did
little more than resurrect the engaging but largely irrelevant novelties of
Cournot and Edgeworth. . . . One certain fact about oligopoly (and its
counterpart on the buyer's side of the market) is that the entire market
solution can be altered unilaterally by any single participant. This is at
once the simplest and the most critical distinction between oligopoly and
pure competition. It also means that the methodological device by which
the competitive market has been analyzed, i.e. laying down general as-
sumptions about the group response of numerous individuals to common
stimuli, is inadmissible. Rather the assumptions must be sufficiently
comprehensive to cover the behavior of each participant in the market.
• . . Edgeworth and Cournot and, in that tradition, Chamberlin, merely
derived the market solution that followed from two or three out of a near
infinity of possible behavior combinations. It follows that they were not
41 The term "tight" oligopoly is defined as a market in which eight or fewer firms
supply 50 percent of the market, with the largest firm having 20 percent or more. A
"loose" oligopoly is defined as a market in which fewer than 20 firms supply 75 per-
cent of the market, and where no single firm supplies more than 10 percent to 15 per-
cent. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 20, at 72.
42 G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 135. The report of the Stigler Committee
reaches a substantially similar result.
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offering a theory of duopoly or oligopoly but displaying a few examples.
Little progress has been made to an analysis of oligopoly by this route and
little could be expected. 43
There is a not insignificant body of evidence indicating that oligopoly is
perfectly compatible with active price competition. 44 There may be sufficient
evidence at this time to support the current Merger Guidelines as to horizon-
tal mergers, at least where a "tight oligopoly" is involved. The social costs
in a merger possibility thwarted or foregone may not be of overwhelming
significance. When the inquiry shifts from merger policy to dissolution of
existing market structures, however, the social costs may be staggering. It
is submitted that if dissolution is the domain of discourse, not enough is
presently known about oligopoly to warrant the implementation of a posi-
tive course of action.45
Even should sufficient data exist to support the general thesis of "inter-
dependence" in oligopoly pricing, too little is known as to how to properly
identify or classify the oligopoly. There is evidence that oligopolists are
moved by motives other than profit maximization. Furthermore oligopoly
power in a given market may be illusory when the power of a few large
buyers is analyzed; and it is noteworthy that great technological progress has
been made in the tightest of oligopolies. If account is taken of these and
similar factors, it is difficult at best to predict what an oligopolist will do.
One of the key problems in identifying the oligopolistic market is in
defining the relevant product and geographic markets. It is elementary that
market definition is of critical importance not only in cases under section 7
of the Clayton Act,48 but in appraising oligopoly power as well. Market
definition will determine, in effect, whether the market is a "loose" oligop-
oly, a "tight" oligopoly, or indeed, an oligopoly at all. If there are close
substitutes available, to which consumers would turn in the event of price
increases, there is no oligopoly power.47 The producers of the substitutes
should therefore be included in the market for oligopoly analysis. This is
particularly important because it is the structure of the market and not its
performance that may be under analysis. Probable performance is a deduc-
tion drawn from the structure of the market.
The proposals of Professors Posner and Turner and the White
House Task Force are alarming not so much for what each proposes, but
in light of what the Supreme Court has already done in the field of market
definition. With increasing frequency, the Supreme Court has defined the
geographic and product dimension of the relevant market in the narrowest
43 Galbraith, Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power, in A SURVEY
OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 99, 101-02 (H. Ellis ed. 1948).
44 See G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 135, for a collection of authorities in
support of this proposition.
45 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6475.
46 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
47 G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 17.
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of terms.48 The Supreme Court evidenced a strong preference since Brown
Shoe for analyzing mergers in the context of horizontal market power.
Several of the more recent merger decisions are particularly disturbing. In
Brown Shoe the relevant markets were defined as separate cities of a popula-
tion of 10,000 or more. In a number of cities the postmerger share was five
percent or less. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,49 Alcoa, a
producer of aluminum conducter wire, proposed to merge with Rome Cable,
90 percent of whose business involved the production of copper wire. The
district court had made a finding50 that aluminum and copper were com-
petitive as to some uses. The Supreme Court, however, ignoring this find-
ing, noted that while Rome was a 90 percent producer of copper wire, it
was also a producer, although a small one, of aluminum wire. This enabled
the Court to seize upon the narrow overlap of identical products, and to
define the line of commerce (relevant product market). The Court found,
again contrary to the district court, that bare and insulated aluminum wire
constituted a single line of commerce. There is no discussion as to what
the shape of the market would have been had aluminum and copper wire
been regarded as the relevant line of commerce. In United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co.,51 a producer of metal cans (Continental) merged with a pro-
ducer of glass containers (Hazel-Atlas). Neither had any production in the
other's industry. The Court found a justification for combining metal cans
and glass containers, although it acknowledged that inter-industry competi-
tion did not exist for many end uses. For other end uses, however, plastic
containers provided competition; yet the Court did not include the plastic
alternate in the line of commerce. Only by this tortuous process was the
Court able to come up with market share percentages that would bring
into play the rule of presumptive illegality established in Philadelphia Bank.
One is tempted to draw the inference that it was the desired result that
determined what the market definition would be. What is even more dis-
turbing, however, is the fact that in Brown Shoe the Court promulgated
market definition rules that took into account the economic realities of life.
There, the Court specifically mentioned cross-elasticity of demand, industry
or public recognition, the products' peculiar characteristics and uses, unique
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price
changes, and specialized vendors. 52 The Court stated:
Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition of the
relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one. The geographic market
selected must, therefore, both "correspond to the commercial realities"
of the industry and be economically significant. 53
48Hibner, Attempts To Monopolize: A Concept In Search of Analysis, 34 A.B.A.
ANTnImsT L.J. 165, 168 (1967).
49377 U.S. 271 (1964).
50 214 F. Supp. 501, 509 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
51 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
52 570 US. at 325.
538 Id. at 336-37.
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The Court's departure from these principles is not limited to merger
cases. In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,54 the Court held that the de-
fendant had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by the willful acquisition
or maintenance of monopoly power in the accredited central station systems
industry (burglar alarms, fire alarms and sprinkler supervisory service).
Grinnell, which controlled 87 percent of this market (an "accredited" sys-
tem is one approved by insurance underwriters), argued that protective
services other than accredited central station systems should have been in-
cluded within the relevant market. The Court combined burglar alarms and
fire alarms into one product category of "protection of property."55 It re-
fused, however, to include other alarm and watchman services, although
the district court found that this competition affected the price Grinnell
could charge for its services. 56
The recent Supreme Court decisions in the merger field, as well as the
decision in Grinnell, when considered in light of the equivocal state of
economic knowledge as to oligopoly behavior, should put us on notice that
extreme caution should be exercised in dealing with vested oligopoly
power. The power may well be non-existent or ephemeral. George and
Rosemary Hale sum it up this way:
While some economists take a more optimistic view of the problem, we
can scarcely say that the case for illegality of oligopoly is so well estab-
lished as to provide a firm foundation for recommendations to courts and
legislatures.57
SUGGESTED EXTENSION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Suggested Extension of Section 1
Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade . 5.8.5s
Can section 1 be used as a weapon against vested oligopoly power?
Where the oligopoly has degenerated into price fixing, group boycott or
other joint exclusionary activities, the answer is obvious. But what of the
oligopoly in which "interdependence" exists in the absence of any overt
collusion? One of the hallmarks of the classical oligopoly model is a marked
degree of parallel or "consciously parallel" action. "Conscious parallelism"
became a word of antitrust art with Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States.59
There, an exhibitor of motion pictures sent form letters to competitors
asking them to maintain a minimum admission price. Although there was
no direct evidence of agreement, the Court nevertheless found a violation.
54 384 U.S, 563 (1966).
55 Id. at 572.
56 Id. at 574.
57 G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 11, at 137.
58 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
59 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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This case could be used to support an argument that mutual forebearance
constitutes a meeting of the minds and is all the agreement that the
Sherman Act requires. Accepting that premise, it is not difficult to apply
the same reasoning to interdependent oligopolists, who are also engaging
in an arms length type of "mutual forebearance." Such an argument would
not read agreement out of the Sherman Act anymore than did Interstate
Circuit. That case simply holds that an inference of agreement can be
drawn from (a) a proposal of a scheme of action; (b) subsequent near
unanimity of action; and (c) the failure of defendants to call as witnesses
the officials who would have had knowledge of the existence or nonexistence
of an agreement. 60 Thus the trial court was justified in drawing the con-
clusion that defendant's officials would have testified adversely. Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.O1 does not alter the
fact that Interstate Circuit was probably correctly decided on its facts. The
dictum in Theatre Enterprises that "[c]onscious parallelism has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely" 62 is consistent with Interstate
Circuit. While the facts in Theatre Enterprises were entirely consistent with
noncollusion, in Interstate Circuit they were not, especially when coupled
with the adverse inference drawn as to defendant's failure to call its officials
as witnesses. Both cases are consistent with the proposition that actual agree-
ment is still required by section 1 of the Sherman Act, and neither case is
particularly helpful in determining the merits of extending the Sherman
Act to cover oligopoly situations where "interdependence" but not active
collusion is present.6
Professor Posner seems to agree that actual agreement is a necessary
element. 64 He nevertheless argues that Sherman 1 can be used to declare
illegal the "tacit collusion" that occurs because of the interdependent struc-
ture of the oligopoly market. His view is that the only difference between
a formal cartel and tacit collusion is that the latter is easier to conceal.65
Where is the collusion? It apparently occurs in a fashion similar to the
formation of a unilateral contract. An "offer" communicating a restriction
on output is "accepted" by the actions of the rivals in following suit.66
60 Id. at 221.
61346 U.S. 537 (1954). In Theatre Enterprises, the petitioner brought suit under
the Clayton Act for treble damages and an injunction, alleging that the defendants
had violated the antitrust laws by conspiring to restrict first-run pictures to downtown
Baltimore theatres, thus confining petitioner's suburban theatre to subsequent runs
and unreasonable "clearances."
62 Id. at 541.
63 One commentator has argued that an actual agreement must be proved be-
cause the Sherman Act is a criminal statute. See Rahl, Price Competition and the Price
Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 137, 147 (1962).
64 Posner, supra note 21.
05 Id. at 1575.
66 Id. at 1576.
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Recognizing the inherent difficulty of proof in such a situation, Professor
Posner then proposes a series of economic tests from which inferences can
be drawn.67
As does Professor Turner,68 I have a great deal of difficulty with this
argument. It may well be that certain permissible inferences could be drawn
from Professor Posner's economic tests. Coupled with some evidence of
active collusion, a garden variety case of conspiracy might be made out.
Beyond that, however, Professor Posner's thesis could create arbitrary results
and impending chaos. First of all, we do not know enough about any par-
ticular oligopoly market. There may well be forces operating in that market
that prevent it from operating like Professor Chamberlin's model. The
market may not be "interdependent" at all. In that situation would any
inference about "accepting" an "offer" be warranted? More important
perhaps is Professor Turner's criticism.69 In responding to a rival's curtail-
ment of output, the oligopolist is behaving rationally. The only difference
between our oligopolist and any other businessman is that because of the
market structure, the oligopolist has more information upon which to base
his decision. We should encourage businessmen to make rational business
decisions based upon all of the information legally available to them. It
would be bad law and probably impossible psychologically 'to punish a
businessman for rationally responding to the actions of a competitor, no
matter what the market structure.
It is submitted that section 1 of the Sherman Act should be used only
where sufficient evidence of actual agreement, or actual concerted exclu-
sionary practices, is evident. Professor Posner's suggestion does not meet
the requirements of Interstate Circuit, and should therefore be discarded.
Any inferences that could be drawn from the type of evidence he suggests
would be conducive of conflicting inferences, not simply "tacit collusion."
Suggested Extension of Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike section 1, condemns unilateral as
well as concerted action. Section 2, at first blush, would appear to be better
suited to the "interdependent" behavior which the oligopoly market the-
oretically exhibits. Yet, section 2 really defines three separate crimes,70 none
of which are readily adaptable for use in attacking oligopolies. It provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
67 Id. at 1578-84. The proof would be established by evidence of systematic price
discrimination, prolonged excess of capacity over demand, existence of fixed market
shares over a period of time, filing of identical bids on non-standard items, static
nature of market prices, abnormal profits, and price leadership.
68 See Turner, supra note 26, at 1226-27; Turner, supra note 21, at 663-71. Similarly,
Professor Turner would not extend the concept of "combination," as was recently done
in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). Turner, supra note 26, at 1227.
69 Turner, supra note 21.
70 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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combine or conspire ... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states.., shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... 71
Because three separate crimes are set out in the statute, each must be
analyzed separately. Because combination or conspiracy to monopolize re-
quires the same proof of concerted action as is required for a violation of
section 1, it is no more available for use against oligopoly power than sec-
tion 1. The crimes of monopolization and attempted monopolization may,
however, arise through unilateral as well as concerted action. 72
A. Monopolization
Monopolization under section 2 consists of two elements. These are (1)
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the "purpose-
ful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power." Thus, "monopoly" in
the economic sense does not constitute the offense of monopolization. In-
stead, it is the possession of a degree of economic power with the additional
element of an "intent" or "purpose" to acquire the power or to use that
power once acquired.73 "Monopoly power" has been defined as "the power
to control prices or exclude competition."7 4 Because the power to exclude
competitors or to control prices is an elusive concept at best, the courts have
looked to a more concrete indicia, holding that monopoly power may be
inferred from the predominance of the market share of the alleged monop-
olist.7 5 In the famous Alcoa case, Judge Hand stated that 90 percent of a mar-
ket was a clear monopoly, 60 percent, doubtful, and 30 percent, clearly not.76
There may well be oligopoly industries where one firm may have such a
predominant market share as to be guilty of monopolization. But what of
a three-firm market where the shares are 40 percent, 30 percent and 30 per-
cent. Such a market would certainly be defined as a highly concentrated
one, and should be expected to exhibit anti-competitive behavior. Under
the Learned Hand dictum, none of the three firms would be guilty of
monopolization. Professor Turner would reason otherwise. In his view,
there is not enough difference between individual and "shared monopoly"
to warrant different treatment.7 Because of "interdependence," the mo-
nopoly power that would be possessed by one firm in a single firm industry
71 See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
72See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 709
(1962).
73See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Where the power
has been maintained for a substantial period, the element of intent is close to being
conclusively presumed, and improper tactics are largely irrelevant. Judge Learned Hand
said: "To read the passage [section 2] as demanding any 'specific' intent makes non-
sense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
74 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 784 (1946).
75 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
76 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
77Turner, supra note 26, at 1231.
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would be shared by the oligopolists. In an oligopoly that is behaving sim-
ilarly to a monopoly, "monopoly power" would be present even where the
individual market shares would not otherwise support that inference.
Professor Turner discusses the point in the context of Alcoa, and is ad-
dressing himself to long-term, relatively rigid market structures that are
substantially impervious to erosion by market forces,78
My criticism of this approach is basically the same as that directed to
Professor Posner's "tacit collusion" theory. Not enough is known about
oligopoly markets to warrant such an extension.7 9 It is improper to assume
that monopoly power is in fact "shared." If the market shares of the
oligopolists have remained stable, there are conflicting inferences that can
be drawn from that fact alone. Where there is no evidence of overt collu-
sion or serious exclusionary conduct, the inferences suggest that monopoly
power is either not being shared, or is not being used or purposely main-
tained. The oligopolists, through pressure from potential entrants, reason-
ably interchangeable substitutes, or ignorance, may have charged very
low prices; the fact of low prices may, in turn, have deterred either entry
or a switch to reasonably interchangeable substitute products. Even if the
oligopolists had charged monopoly prices, entry may still have been de-
terred because of superior technology or because the oligopolists, through
efficiency, had lower costs than the new entrant would have had. Unless we
can answer all of these questions, it is unwarranted, as reported in the
Stigler Report, to use the antitrust laws to deconcentrate highly oligopolistic
industries through dissolution of the leading firms.8 0 Only where the
elements of actual monopolization are proven - monopoly power plus
purpose - should this portion of section 2 of the Sherman Act be utilized.
Market share is only one indicia of monopoly power. There may be other
means of showing that it is present in firms with market shares falling below
Learned Hand's "doubtful" 60 percent, but monopoly power cannot be
assumed to be shared simply because a relevant market has few sellers.
B. Attempts to Monopolize
Very little is known about attempts to monopolize under section 2 of
the Sherman Act, and there has been a definite split of authority over what
the precise elements of the crime are.8 ' Some commentators have reported
that only a specific intent to monopolize plus an overt act in furtherance
thereof are required.8 2 Under that analysis, monopoly power or market
share was irrelevant. If the proper intent could be proved, there would be
78 Id.
79 See STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6475.
80 Id.
81 Compare Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir, 1964) with
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) and Hiland Dairy Inc.
v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
82 Turner, Antitrust Policy And The Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 294
(1956).
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no reason why any act of unfair competition would not constitute an at-
tempt to monopolize. This view, however, has remained a minority one,
and more recent cases have continued to support the majority position.88
In American Tobacco Co., the Supreme Court approved the following in-
struction, which sets forth the required elements:
The phrase "attempt to monopolize" means the employment of
methods, means and practices which would, if successful, accomplish
monopolization, and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach
so dose to create a dangerous probability of it, which methods, means
and practices are so employed by the members of and pursuant to a com-
bination or conspiracy formed for the purpose of such accomplishment.8 4
Thus, because an "attempt" must be an attempt to commit the sub-
stantive crime, it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the acts
constituting the act would have been reasonably effective in creating an
actual monopoly. The issue in an attempt case is, therefore, whether the
defendant would have succeeded in acquiring monopoly power had the
acts he set in motion been properly executed. As one commentator noted:
Potential power to control requires proof of the same character, but not
necessarily the same quantum as that necessary to establish the existence
of monopoly power where the charge is monopolization.85
It is not absolutely necessary that a defendant accused of attempted
monopolization have any particular market share, since, as in monopoliza-
tion, market share is merely evidence from which monopoly power may
be inferred. In the normal situation, however, market share evidence is
the crux of the matter. There may be no other available means of proving
monopoly power other than looking to the actual market share of the de-
fendant. It would be the unusual situation for a company without an ap-
preciable market share to be able to acquire monopoly power.86
On the above analysis, it is clear that an oligopolistic market structure,
without more, would not supply the necessary ingredients for an attempt
to monopolize attack. This is so for at least two reasons. First, a specific
intent to achieve monopolization must be proven. While such an intent
may be inferred from contemporaneous documents and from a history of
business conduct,8 7 it is oftentimes inferred from the particular business
83 See, e.g., Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
84 328 U.S. at 785.
85Johnston, Monopolize or Attempt to Monopolize, 3 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 72,
71 (1953).
88 In Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir, 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 961 (1969), the court held that a monopolist must control a substantial part of
the market to be able to raise or lower price, or to restrict competition. It stated that
20 percent was insufficient.
87 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp 545, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1960);
Smith, Attempt to Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 Gao. WASH. L.
Rav. 227, 231-32 (1958).
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practices complained of.88 The structure of an oligopoly market cannot
supply acts upon which any finding of specific intent could be based. Sec-
ondly, the structure of the oligopolistic market will not supply proof of an
approach to monopoly power. Structure, without more, may be subject to
any number of competing inferences.
Professor Turner took the position in an earlier paper that specific
intent, as shown by coercive conduct or absence of "normal business pur-
pose," became the only element of the offenses of attempt to monopolize
and conspiracy to monopolize. This approach has been criticized as con-
fusing "conspiracy" and "attempt," and has not been followed by the
courts.8 9 Professor Turner has recently reiterated this view and urged that
Where oligopolists sharing monopoly power have engaged in restrictive
conduct lacking any substantial justification, they may appropriately be
said to have unlawfully attempted to monopolize.9 0
This statement is no more analytical than its predecessor. If specific
intent to monopolize plus an approach to monopoly power can be proven,
that is one thing. The statute requires nothing less. To make the leap from
exclusionary acts to attempt to monopolize is another matter. Not every
business tort should be regarded as an attempt to monopolize.
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
In 1959, Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner made several suggested legis-
lative approaches which were designed to deconcentrate concentrated ol-
igopolies. One suggestion was to condemn "unreasonable market power"
and dissolve firms possessing it. An extremely complicated series of economic
criteria were required to be established by the Government. A second ap-
proach was to use presumptive rules of illegality to dispense with the com-
plicated economic proof required by the first approach. Market power was
to be conclusively presumed where, for five years or more, one company had
at least 50 percent of the sales in the relevant market, and four companies
had 80 percent of the sales.9' In a later article, Professor Turner re-
iterated that a "suitably drafted new statute" would be the best solution,
and that where "moral dereliction" was not involved, criminal sanctions
and private rights of action should be excluded.92 The problem with the
first Kaysen and Turner approach is that it is overly complicated and im-
practical, while the "conclusive presumption" approach presumes that we
possess knowledge as to oligopoly pricing that we in fact do not.
A more recent legislative approach was suggested by the White House
88 Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 975; Union Leader Corp. v. News-
papers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
833 (1961).
89 Turner, supra note 82.
90 Turner, supra note 26, at 1230.
91 C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 20, at 110-19.
92 Turner, supra note 26, at 1226.
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Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, released May 21, 1969 (hereinafter
Neal Report). This report not only recommended specific legislation on
the subject of oligopolies, but drafted a proposed "Concentrated Industries
Act," which directs the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to investigate the structures of markets which appear to be oligopolies.
When the Attorney General determines that a specific market is an ol-
igopoly, he is to institute a proceeding in equity for the "reduction of con-
centration."93 A court must then determine whether the market under
attack is an oligopoly, and which of the companies are oligopoly firms. No
affirmative relief should be taken for a one year period so that "voluntary
steps looking toward reduction of concentration" can be taken.94 If none
are taken, a further proceeding is to be held, and within four years, the
market shares of the oligopolists are not to exceed 12 percent. A decree may
require substantial modification of existing contractual relationships and/or
methods of distribution. In section 4 of the proposed Act, the terms are
defined. An "oligopoly industry" is a market where four or fewer firms have
an aggregate market share of 70 percent during seven of ten and four of
the most recent base years. An "oligopoly firm" is one with a market share
in excess of 15 percent during two of the three most recent base years. 95
A "market" is a "relevant economic market" with aggregate sales of at least
$500 million during each of at least four out of five base years.
The major deficiencies of this approach are several. First, as one dis-
senter pointed out, the Act is based upon shaky structures which, upon
correlation, prove nothing.96 More importantly, the cost to society of
implementing such a program may be beyond measurement. The dismem-
berment of the major companies of the country is not a step to be taken
in haste or in anger. Simply stated, once done, it cannot be undone. Present
knowledge is too sketchy for the heavy handed approach of the Neal Report
to be sanctioned.
These facts were pointed out in an even more recent report. In the
Report of President Nixon's Task Force On Productivity and Competition
(hereinafter Stigler Report), Professor Stigler's Committee made the fol-
lowing comments on oligopoly control:
[T]he economists have not succeeded in fully identifying the characteristics
of an industry which determine whether it will behave competitively or
monopolistically.9 7
The Committee made several other noteworthy observations on the
oligopoly problem. They questioned whether even collusive behavior in an
93 NEAL TASK FORcE REPORT at 5649.
94 Id.
95 Id.
9e Id. at 5657 (separate statement of Robert H. Bork).
97 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6475.
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oligopolistic industry required as radical a remedy as dissolution. In addi.
tion, they questioned whether the standards of permissible concentration
should be wholly different for pending mergers than for established enter-
prises. Concentration, they noted, is not a major determinant of differences
among industries in profitability, although it may sometimes be a significant
factor. Finally, they stated:
Concern with oligopoly has led to proposals to use the antitrust laws
(perhaps amended) to deconcentrate highly oligopolistic industries by dis-
solving their leading firms. We cannot endorse these proposals on the basis
of existing knowledge. As indicated, the correlation between concentra-
tion and profitability is weak, and many factors besides the number of
firms in a market appear to be relevant to the competitiveness of their
behavior.9 8
CONCLUSION
Oligopoly industries undoubtedly present the most difficult problems
in antitrust policy. There is a body of evidence that suggests that oligopoly
industries - at least some - behave in a manner that is different from less
concentrated industries. Economic theory suggests that this is because the
decision-making process is altered by the fact that a decision by one firm
will necessarily have an effect on the total market and on all of the other
participants. Evidence also suggests that oligopoly markets have within their
structure the seeds for future hard-core antitrust violations.
Based upon the evidence at hand, and upon honest desires to reduce
concentration in key industries, various commentators have suggested ju-
dicial and legislative extensions of antitrust doctrines. In each case, how-
ever, they would overcure the patient and possibly cause serious damage.
The state of our economic knowledge is all too imperfect. All industries
with few sellers do not behave in the same manner. The correlation is
simply too weak a foundation upon which to base radical change in anti-
trust policy. Additional studies of particular oligopoly industries are needed.
As the Stigler Report suggests, the Antitrust Division should maintain a
policy of strict and uncommitting scrutiny of highly oligipolistic industries.
Radical swigery, however, is not warranted at this time, as it is not sup-
ported by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
98 Id.
